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Abstract 
During  the  last  decades  banks  have  progressively  moved  towards 
centralized  and  hierarchical  organizational  structures.  Therefore,  the 
investigation of the determinants of bank efficiency and relationships with 
the  functional  distance  between  the  bank  head-quarter  and  operational 
units have become increasingly important. This paper extends the literature 
on bank efficiency examining the impact of different bank business models 
on the efficiency of the Italian banks, distinguished by size and type over 
the  period  2006-2009.  Using  a  stochastic  frontier  approach,  the 
intertemporal relationships between bank efficiency and some key variables, 
as  distance  and  income  diversification  (used  as  proxies  of  different 
organizational  banking  models)  are  investigated.  Results  suggest  that 
organizational structure significantly affects cost efficiency, being different 
between bank groups. 
Keywords:  relationship  lending;  bank  groups;  credit  risk;  stochastic 
frontiers; panel data. 
JEL classification: G21; L11; L25. 
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1. Introduction and motivation 
During the last decades, banks have progressively moved towards largest, 
centralized  and  hierarchical  organizational  structures.  In  the  attempt  to 
improve  their  performance  some  banks  passed  from  the  traditional 
“originate to hold model” to the “originate to distribute model” where banks 
do not hold the loans they originate but repackage and securitize them. The 
prevalence of the “originate to distribute” model over the past twenty years 
has led to a significant growth of the structured finance market all over the 
world. Many of these new products have been re-intermediated in banks’ 
balance  sheets  in  the  attempt  to  increase  bank  performance.  The 
investment  in  non-interest  generating  activities  have  implied  bank 
performance  vulnerability,  with  particularly  destabilizing  effects  during 
turbulence  time.  As  suggested  by  recent  literature,  this  effect  has  been 
stronger  for  large  banks  (cf.  De  Jonghe,  2010;  Demirgüç-Kunt  and 
Huizinga,  2010  and  2011).  Taking  into  account  the  destabilizing  effects 
produced  by  the  recent  financial  crisis,  many  banks  have  become 
increasingly  concerned  about  controlling  and  analyzing  their  costs  and 
revenues,  as  well  as  measuring  the  risks  taken  to  produce  acceptable 
returns.  
In  line  with  these  developments,  recent  literature has evolved  examining 
alternative  banking  organizational  models,  risk  and  efficiency  issues  (cf. 
Kano et al., 2011; Berger and Black, 2011; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2010  and  Fiordelisi  et  al.,  2011).  With  reference  to efficiency  issues,  the 
level  of  attention  has  increased  due  to  the  growing  complexity  and 
competitiveness  of  the  relevant  market  situation  and  different 
methodological approaches have been employed to investigate financial firm 
efficiency (for some recent studies see JBF special issue, 34, 2010; Bos et 
al., 2009 and Fiordelisi et al. 2011). 
Among  efficiency  determinants,  size,  capital,  risk  and  environmental 
factors, reveal to be the most investigated, conversely at our knowledge no 
empirical  studies  have  analyzed  whether  relationship  lending  factors 
influence bank efficiency levels.   3 
According  to  the  Church  Tower  Principle  (CRP),  proposed  by  Carling  and 
Lundberg (2005, p. 40), “the bank is the church tower and from its outlook 
it can screen and monitor firms in its proximity”. Authors refer to this as 
asymmetric information, which increases in distance. This principle appears 
to  be  particularly  relevant  for  the  Italian  banking  system  whose  lending 
service  is  mainly  addressed  to  SMEs  being  highly  opaque.  The  distance 
between the bank HQ and its branches could exacerbate the loan evaluating 
process,  negatively  affecting  the  overall  bank  efficiency.  The  rationale  is 
that as the distance between the borrowing firm and the bank loan decision 
unit  increases  the  relationship  lending  weakens  and  the  firm  credit 
evaluation process becomes problematic (cf. Alessandrini et al., 2009). 
The  different  banking  business  attitudes  can  also  be  analysed  by 
considering the degree of income and asset diversification. Since the early 
1990s,  in  Italy  as  well  as  in  the  US  and  other  European  countries,  the 
banking  industry  has  moved  from  interest  towards  non-interest  income 
models. Although financial assets diversification policies aim to increase the 
return they may generate a higher risk and destabilizing effects, affecting 
the overall bank performance. Whether this strategy positively affects risk-
adjusted  bank  profitability,  or,  in  contrast,  the  strong  increase  in  non-
interest  income  causes  a  troublesome  growth  of  profit  instability  is  an 
empirical question. Some Authors evidence that the higher volatility of net-
interest income outweighs diversification benefits (Mercieca et al., 2007 and 
Lozano-Vivas and Paiouras, 2010). As regards Italy, Chiorazzo et al. (2008) 
show that the opposite result holds: the shift toward activities generating 
non-interest income has been proved to be beneficial. Furthermore, it has 
been shown that diversification gains associated with non-interest income 
diminish  with  bank  size,  that  is  small  banks  with  very  little  non-interest 
income  share  make  financial  performance  gains  from  increasing  non-
interest income. This result, however, is not necessarily confirmed during 
financial turbulence period.  
The  novelty  of  the  paper  relies  on  the  investigation  of  the  relationships 
between  bank  lending  attitude  and  efficiency.  In  particular,  the  paper 
extends previous literature by examining whether the impact of the diverse   4 
business models differently impact on efficiency in respect to bank size and 
type, over the period 2006-2009. Using a stochastic frontier approach, the 
intertemporal relationships between bank efficiency and some key variables, 
as  distance  and  income  diversification  –  used  as  proxies  of  different 
organizational banking models – are investigated. In particular, we suggest 
using the distance – between bank local branches and its head-quarter (HQ) 
–as  a  proxy  of  different  banking  business  models.  The  effects  of  the 
distance on the efficiency are investigated for different bank size and type 
groups. Quality and riskiness of bank loans are also considered to control 
for other sources of bank efficiency variability. 
The Italian banking market is of particular interest to examine these issues 
because, although after the 1993 Banking Law the Italian authorities forced 
a  widespread  deregulation  aimed  at  improving  competition,  privatization 
and greater consolidation of the system, the coexistence of very small and 
very large banks with a quite different business organizational model are 
still present. Banks operating under the relationship lending model are able 
to  gather  additional  (private)  information  about  borrowers  which  is  not 
readily  available  to  the  public,  facilitating  informal  agreements  between 
borrower and lender. As a consequence, borrowers receive an implicit credit 
insurance  through  more  favorable  loan  terms  when  facing  economic 
distress, while lenders are compensated by information rents during normal 
times (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Allen and Gale, 1999). Then the recent 
financial downturn – according to the bank relationship attitude adopted – 
may imply heterogeneous effects on efficiency between bank groups. The 
evident credit quality depreciation over the period suggests including asset 
risk  and  quality  when  evaluating  efficiency  to  avoid  possible  misleading 
results. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  a  brief 
literature review on recent developments in financial firm efficiency placing 
particular emphasis on various studies comparing groups of banks differing 
by  size  and  juridical  category.  Section  3  outlines  the  methodology  and 
section 4 reports the results. Section 5 is the conclusion.   5 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Efficiency and bank groups 
Over  the  last  decades,  empirical  analysis  of  the  relationship  between 
efficiency, ownership and size in the banking sector have regarded country-
specific and cross-country studies.  
Altunbas  et  al.  (2001)  investigate  how  bank  ownership  forms  –  private, 
public  and  mutual  –  affect  cost  and  profit  X-inefficiency  in  the  German 
banking  market.  Considering  that  “heterogeneity  within  the  banking 
industry  precludes  meaningful  comparison  because  of  differences  in 
underlying  cost  frontier  and  technologies”  (op.  cit.  p.  50),  the  Authors 
suggest estimating cost and profit frontiers for the three ownership types, 
separately. Model estimates evidence that all types of banks benefit from 
widespread economies of scale, and within each ownership type the larger 
banks tend to realize greater economies. Moreover, the mutual banks seem 
to perform better than private ones, having a lower cost of funds than other 
banks due, for example, to their possible local monopolies. 
Assuming that different size groups of banks– small, medium and large - 
use  the  same  production  technology,  Akhigbe  and  McNulty  (2003)  show 
that small banks are more profit efficient than large banks. Using a two-step 
profit  efficiency  approach  the  Authors  explore  whether  several  factors 
related to banking structure competition and location, as well as the bank’s 
financial ratios, affect small bank efficiency scores. Some key results  are 
reached:  i)  the  efficiency  increases  with  bank  size.  This  result  is  not 
coherent with the so called information asymmetry hypothesis, that is the 
smallest are the banks the better are their loan customers screening with 
positive  effects  in  terms  of  greater  profit  efficiency;  ii)  the  efficiency  is 
greater for banks operating in more concentrated markets; iii) small bank 
profit efficiency  is negatively affected by the market non-performing  loan 
ratio but they are not influenced by the bank internal non-performing loan 
ratio. Such a results are not unequivocally confirmed in the case of other   6 
groups of banks, suggesting some degree of heterogeneity among different 
size banking groups (cf. Akhigbe and McNulty, 2005). 
As regards the Italian banking market, Girardone et al. (2004) propose a 
comparative X-efficiency and economies of scale analysis for different bank 
groups classified with respect to size, type and geographical location. The 
analysis  evidences  that  the  highest  cost  efficiency,  either  in  terms  of  X-
efficiency  or  economies  of  scale,  is  reached  by  large  and  medium  banks 
generally located in the northern regions. Among bank categories, the most 
efficient  reveals  to  be  the  mutual  banks.  Economies  of  scale  and  local 
monopoly power could explain this result. A negative relationship between 
size  and  inefficiency  is  found  only  for  very  small  banks,  evidencing  the 
relevant role played by economies of scale within this group. Furthermore, 
very small banks are characterized by a positive and statistical significant 
relation  between  inefficiency  and  risk  (measured  by  the  non-performing 
loans). 
More recently, Girardone et al. (2009) have conducted a comparative study 
at the European level, investigating efficiency for different ownership bank 
groups across bank- and market-based countries. The rationale is that the 
different  bank  typologies  –  commercial,  mutual  and  saving  -  are 
homogenous from an operational point of view but they are heterogeneous 
in  respect  to  legal  structure.  Commercial  banks  can  be  either  privately 
owned or joint stock companies, while saving banks can be established both 
by  municipal  authorities  or  by  private  individuals  with  any  government 
involvement
2. Using a stochastic frontier approach, the Authors show that 
the  most  efficient  Italian  group  is  formed  by  saving  banks,  followed  by 
mutual and commercial banks. These results hold in the case of efficiency 
scores  based  either  on  a  common  European  frontier  or  on  two  separate 
frontiers for bank- and market based countries. 
Following  the  same  efficiency  methodology  in  the  paper  we  suggest 
investigating  the  relationship  between  banking  business  model  and 
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efficiency estimating either a full-sample cost frontier or single cost frontiers 
within different bank type and size groups. In particular, we classify banks 
in respect to size, distinguishing between large, small and minor banks, and 
categories, that is mutual, cooperative & saving and other joint stock banks. 
 
2.2 Relationship lending and bank efficiency 
2.2.1 What is the role of diversification on efficiency? 
Since  the  early  1990s,  in  Italy  as  well  as  in  the  US  and  other  European 
countries  the  banking  industry  has  moved  from  interest  towards  non-
interest income models. An asset and income bank diversification strategy 
may imply positive and negative effects on the overall risk-adjusted bank 
profitability.  Some  authors  show  that  the  higher  volatility  of  net-interest 
income outweighs diversification benefits. Several studies have investigated 
the  effects  of  banks’  divergent  strategies  toward  specialization  and 
diversification  of  banking  financial  activities  on  bank  performance,  bank 
risk, bank stability etc. for US and European countries
3. 
Bank  income  and  asset  diversification  is  also  a  topic  of  interest  in  the 
banking  efficiency  literature.  In  this  respect,  Lozano-Vivas  and  Paiouras 
(2010) investigate the relevance of non-traditional activities on efficiency in 
the  case  of  publicly  quoted  commercial  banks  in  87 worldwide  countries. 
The  Authors  analyze  the  relevance  of  non-traditional  activities  in  the 
cost/profit  function.  As  a  proxy  of  the  non-traditional  activities,  the  off-
balance sheet activities (OBS) and non-interest income are interchangeably 
used. The analysis suggests that, on average, cost efficiency increases if the 
OBS or non-interest income are considered as additional output in the cost 
function. With respect to profit efficiency, the results are more ambiguous. 
Considering OBS as additional output does not substantially change profit 
efficiency. Alternatively, the non-interest  income based model determines 
higher profit efficiency scores. Akhigbe and Stevenson (2010) discuss the 
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relevance of the non-traditional activities on profit efficiency for US banking 
holding  companies  over  the  2003-2006  period.    The  analysis  shows  that 
increases in non-interest income, especially underwriting/brokerage income, 
negatively affects profit efficiency. The effect is less evident for medium and 
large banks that can offset the decrease in cost efficiency with an increase 
in revenue efficiency. 
With reference to European small banks over 1997-2003 period, Mercieca et 
al.  (2007)  find  that  that  the  higher  volatility  of  net-interest  income 
outweighs diversification benefits. As regards Italy, Chiorazzo et al. (2008) 
show that the shift toward activities that generate non-interest income had 
proved  to  be  beneficial.  Diversification  gains  associated  with  non-interest 
income  also  diminish  with  bank  size,  that  is  small  banks  with  low  non-
interest  income  share  make  financial  performance  gains  from  increasing 
non-interest income. 
Following the above literature in the paper we consider the effects of asset 
diversification either in the cost function or in the inefficiency models. The 
aim is to investigate whether bank propensity toward non-interest income 
affects, and to what extent cost efficiency and whether the impact differs 
among different bank groups. 
 
2.2.2 … and what about the distance? 
A  large  stream  of  the  literature  has  investigated  the  relation  between 
organizational structure, distance and lending conditions (for a survey see 
Cerquiero et al., 2009). 
If a borrower is not located close to a bank, the distance between them can 
act as a “physical gap” affecting both credit price and quantity conditions. 
From a theoretical point of view the distance influences lending conditions 
because of transportation costs and asymmetry of information (Degryse and 
Ongena, 2005). Since greater distance implies larger transportation costs, 
the bank can exploit at the local level a stronger monopoly power charging 
higher loan rates to borrowers located closest to its bank branch. Then, a   9 
negative relation between the loan rate and the borrower-lender distance 
holds. 
A  similar  result  holds  under  the  asymmetric  information  hypothesis.  The 
bank  borrower’s  evaluating  process  becomes  more  imprecise  as  the 
distance between the lender and the borrower increases. In this respect the 
bank  operating  at  the  local  level  can  have  an  informational  advantage 
charging higher loan rates to closer firms (hold-up). Further investigations 
suggest that the distance can also imply spatial credit rationing problems. 
As  Hauswald  and  Marquez  (2006)  suggest,  the  distance  aggravates  the 
information  asymmetry  problem  implying  credit  rationing  problems  for 
distant firms. 
Another  stream  of  research  have  investigated  the  relationships  between 
distance,  bank  internal  organization  and  lending  policies.  Berger  et  al. 
(2005) show that large banks lend at greater distances than small banks, 
being better equipped to collect and act on hard information. Mian (2006) 
finds that local banks are much more concentrated on borrowers displaying 
soft information. As for Italy, Felici and Pagnini (2008) evidence that large 
banks are more able to cope with distance-related entry costs than small 
banks,  by  using  hard  information.  Moreover,  the  analysis  suggests  that 
banks have become increasingly able to open branches in distant markets, 
due  to  the  advent  of  information  and  communication  technologies. 
Nevertheless as suggested by the Authors distance continues to play a role: 
“Yet  the  fall  in  trade  costs  due  to  distance  brought  about  by  the  new 
technologies  does  not  imply  that  they  are  about  to  disappear.  In  other 
words, we do agree with a recent remark by Degryse and Ongena (2004) 
that ‘distance dies another day’” (p. 527). 
The complexity of the above mentioned relations implies that the empirical 
evidence may produce results that are not uniformly shared over time and 
across  space.  Petersen  and  Rajan  (2002)  show  that  the  technological 
changes  improve  the  monitoring  process  and  thus  the  distance  becomes 
less important in explaining spatial rationing. Other evidences  suggest that 
credit scoring models could improve SMEs evaluation for large and distant   10 
banks  relaxing  the  necessity  of  relationship  based  models
4  (Berger  and 
Frame, 2007; De Young et al., 2008). More recently, Berger et al. (2010) 
confirm  that  community  banks  make  large  use  of  credit  scores  but  not 
simply “for automatic approval/rejection of loan applicants, suggesting that 
these  institutions  continue  to  stress  relationship  lending  or  other  lending 
technologies”.  Because  relationship  lending  largely  relies  on  “soft 
information” that are typically collected and processed at the local level and 
not  easily  transferable  (Petersen,  2004  and  Stein,  2002),  relationship 
lending  becomes  less  feasible  across  large  distances.  Berger  and  Udell 
(2002) evidence that this type of banking attitude is associated to small and 
decentralized banks. Stein (2002) suggests that the bank based on its own 
organizational  structure  use  different  types  of  information.  For  a  large 
hierarchically  complex  organization  could  be  too  costly  to  collect  “soft 
information” at the local level because of high delegation costs. According to 
the principal-agent theory, delegation may aggravate agency problems. In 
other terms a large and distant bank that specializes in relationship loans 
should invest more in monitoring their loan officers than in the performance 
of  their  loans.  Conversely,  small  decentralized  banks  characterized  by  a 
short distance between the HQ and the branch could have a comparative 
advantage in small business lending. 
To  better  investigate  the  effects  of  the  distance  on  the  bank-borrower 
relationship  a  more  accurate  definition  of  distance  is  suggested  by 
Alessandrini et al. (2009). According to the Authors, functional distance is 
“a character shared by all banks that, given the localism of their decisional 
centres and strategic function are necessarily close to some area and far 
from others”. To this respect, a department with a banking system formed 
by only local credit banks has the lowest value of the functional distance 
indicator; otherwise two departments with equally functionally distance may 
be characterized by different banking systems and concentration/diffusion 
of local banks across the territory. 
 
                                                 
4 On this point see also Berger and Frame (2007).   11 
3. The study method 
3.1 The model 
Evaluating the efficiency of a bank involves a comparison between actual 
and  optimal  values.  In  particular,  it  is  concerned  with  the  comparison 
between observed outputs and maximum potential outputs obtained from 
given inputs; or observed inputs and minimum potential inputs to produce a 
given amount of outputs. It is also possible to define efficiency in terms of 
behavioural goals, where efficiency is measured by comparing observed and 
optimal costs and profits, leading to cost and profit efficiencies respectively. 
In this paper, for measuring the cost efficiency of Italian banks, we use the 
SFA  approach  (Battese  and  Coelli,  1995).  This  model  incorporates  the 
estimation of cost function and the determinants of efficiency at the same 
time, by parameterizing the mean of the efficiency term as a function of 
exogenous variables. 
As for the cost function we consider: 
 
(1)   ) ( ) ln( it it it it U V X TC + + = β , 
 
where  ) ln( it TC is the logarithm of total production cost for bank i at time t, X 
indicates the natural logarithm of input prices and output quantities,  β  is a 
vector  of  unknown  parameters  to  be  estimated;  the  it V s  are  random 
variables that are assumed to be independent and  identically distributed, 
) ; 0 (
2
V N σ . The non-negative random variables, ( it U ), which account for cost 
inefficiency, are assumed to be independently distributed, such that  it U  is 
the truncation (at zero) of the  ) ; (
2 σ µit N -distribution, where  it µ  is a function 
of  observable  explanatory  variables  and  unknown  parameters,  as  defined 
below. We choose the truncated normal form because of the hypothesis that 
the market is competitive, that is, the greater proportion of the enterprises   12 
operate  ‘close’  to  efficiency.  It  is  assumed  that  the it V s  and it U s  are 
independent random variables. 
The  parameters  of  the  frontier  production  function  are  simultaneously 
estimated with those of the inefficiency model (β, δ, σ2, σ2v), in which the 
cost inefficiency effects are specified as a function of other variables:  
 







mit m it z δ δ µ  
 
In the eq. 2 the δs are parameters to be estimated. A positive parameter 
value of δm implies that the mean inefficiency increases as the value of the 
m-input variable increases. 
Maximum-likelihood estimates of the model parameters are obtained using 
the  program,  FRONTIER  4.1,  written  by  Coelli  (1996).  The  variance 
parameters  are  defined  by 
2 2 2 σ σ σ + = V S   and 
2 2 / S σ σ γ =
  originally 
recommended by Battese and Corra (1977). The log-likelihood function of 
this model is presented in the appendix of Battese and Coelli (1993). When 
the  variance  associated  with  the  technical  inefficiency  effects  converges 
toward  zero  (i.e. 
0
2 → σ
)  then  the  ratio  parameter,  γ,  approaches  zero. 
When the variance of the random error (
2
V σ ) decreases in size, relative to 
the variance associated with the technical inefficiency effects, the value of γ 
approaches one.  
The cost efficiency of a unit at a given period of time is defined as the ratio 
of the minimum cost to the observed cost needed to produce a given set of 
outputs. The technical efficiency of the i-th unit in the year t-th is given by: 
 
(3)   ) exp( it it U CE − = . 
 
The cost efficiency of one unit lies between zero and one and is inversely 
related to the inefficiency effect.   13 
With  regard  to  the  nature  of  the  cost  efficiency,  the  general  stochastic 
frontier  model  encompasses  the  following  three  sub  cases:  1)  when 
0 ... 1 0 = = = = = m δ δ δ γ ,  there  is  no  technical  inefficiency  (deterministic  or 
stochastic)  and  the  model  collapses  to  the  traditional  average  production 
function;  2)  when  0 = γ ,  technical  inefficiency  is  not  stochastic  and  the 
explanatory  variables  in  eq.  (2)  must  be  included  in  eq.  (1)  along  with 
inputs; 3) when all δs (except the intercept term) are zero, the zs do not 
affect the efficiency levels. Hypotheses about the nature of the inefficiency 
can  be  tested  using  the  generalised  likelihood  ratio  statistic  (LR  test),  λ, 
given by: 
 
(4)   [ ] )) ( ln( )) ( ln( 2 1 0 H L H L − − = λ , 
 
where  ) ( 0 H L and  ) ( 1 H L  denote the value of the likelihood function under the 
null and alternative hypotheses, respectively. If the given null hypothesis is 
true,  then  λ  has  approximately  a  Chi-square  (or  a  mixed  Chi-square) 
distribution.  If  the  null  hypothesis  involves  0 = γ ,  then  the  asymptotic 
distribution involves a mixed Chi-square distribution (Coelli, 1995). 
 
3.2 The data 
We analyse an unbalanced panel data of 2,597 banks over the period 2006-
2009.  Data  have  been  provided  by  the  Italian  Banking  Association.  The 
coverage  of  our  sample  relative  to  the  population  of  the  whole  Italian 
banking  system  is  nearly  90%,  and  it  is  quite  stable  over  the  analysed 
period. 
In order to control for heterogeneity, we suggest considering different bank 
groups  classified with respect to size and juridical category. The sample 
excludes: i) foreign banks; ii) the central institutions for each category of 
banks; iii) special credit  institutions for special purposes. Table 1 reports 
sample data coverage by size and category over time.   14 
Banks are grouped with respect to size, distinguishing between minor, small 
and large banks. Thresholds are given by Bank of Italy and are based on 
the average amount of total intermediation assets
5. Then, minor banks are 
defined  as  those  with  average  total  intermediation assets  lower  than  1,3 
billions  euro;  small  banks  are  defined  as  those  with  average  total 
intermediation assets included between 1,3 and 9 billions euro; large banks 
comprise all banks with average total intermediation assets higher than 9 
billions euro
6. 
Minor banks represent 75% of the total  number of banks in  our sample, 
small banks correspond to 18% and large banks is only 7% of the total. In 
respect  to  bank  total  asset,  the  composition  of  the  sample  is  simply 
reversed: the minor group represents only 6% of the entire Italian banking 
system, small and large bank groups are 14% and 80%, respectively. 
Banks  are  also  grouped  by  juridical  category,  distinguishing  between 
mutual, cooperative & saving and other joint stock banks. The mutual banks 
are  considered  separately  because  of  their  characteristics:  i)  they  are 
strictly linked to the local market, being present only at the HQ municipality 
and in the neighborhoods; ii) their mutuality characteristic along with fiscal 
benefits imply a greater degree of capitalization. A second group comprises 
cooperative & saving banks. The cooperative group is based on the Italian 
Banking Association  classification. The saving group  is  identified by using 
the ACRI (Italian Association of Saving Banks) classification. The business 
model  of  the  last  two  bank  groups  is  similar,  thus  they  are  jointly 
considered. The third group of the other joint stock banks is obtained as a 
residual. 
The  mutual  banks  represent  64%  of  the  total  banking  system,  the 
cooperative & saving banks correspond to 13%, the other joint stock banks 
                                                 
5 See Bank of Italy Annual Report, 2009 – Methodological notes: tables a17.6 and a17.7. 
6 The Bank of Italy classifies banks according to five groups: very big (with total average 
financial intermediation assets higher than 60 billions Euros); big (between 26 and 60 billions 
Euros); medium (between 9 and 26 billions Euros); small (between 1,3 and 9 billions Euros) 
and very small (lower than 1,3 billions Euros). Because of the small number of observations 
in the medium, big and very big samples separately considered, we have grouped them in 
one group denominated “large banks”.   15 
to 23%. With respect to the total asset, mutual banks represent 7% of the 
entire banking system while cooperative & saving group and the other joint 
stock banks are, respectively, 19% and 74%. 
 
(insert Tab. 1 here) 
 
3.3 The cost function specification 
In  the  literature,  the  definition  of  bank  inputs  and  outputs  varies  across 
studies.  This  study  follows  the  so  called  value-added  approach,  originally 
proposed by Berger and Humphrey (1992). This approach asserts that all 
liabilities and assets of banks have some output characteristics, rather than 
categorizing them as either inputs or outputs only
7. The econometric models 
are specified for panel data, with both stochastic frontier cost function and 
inefficiency  model.  A  flexible  functional  form  as  the  translog  production 
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where  it c ln  is the natural logarithm of the operative cost of bank i in year t. 
Accordingly to the value-added approach and following (see among others 
Akhigbe and McNulty (2003), we consider three outputs,  kit q ln  (k=1, 2, 3), 
that  are:  total  net  loans,  retail  deposits  and  fee-based  financial  services 
                                                 
7  The  other  two  approaches  used  to  define  inputs  and  outputs  in  banking  are:  i)  the 
intermediation approach that assumes that banks collect deposits to transform them, using 
labour and capital, into loans and other assets; ii) the production approach that consider 
banks as producers of deposit and loans in terms of the number accounts, using labour and 
capital.    16 
(i.e.  non-interest  income  assets),  respectively.  pit p ln   (p=1,2,3)  is  the 
logarithm of three price, that are  the price for wage rate for  labour, the 
price  of  borrowed  price  of  funds  and  the  price  of  physical  capital, 
respectively.  We  also  consider  a  fixed  input  E,  that  is  the  equity  capital 
defined at the bank level, controlling for differences in equity capital risk 
across banks. Banks with lower equity ratios are assumed to be more risky, 
in  line  with  Mester  (1996).  The  cost  frontier  may  also  shift  over  time 
according to the values of the parameters  t β  and  2 t β . 
The conditions for ensuring that the cost function is linearly homogeneous 
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To  meet  these  homogeneity  conditions,  eq.  (5)  is  transformed  into  a 
normalized function. Specifically, costs and input prices are normalized by 
the price of wage rate for labour (p1). Then, the normalized cost function to 
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Table A1 in the Appendix presents a detailed description of the input and 
output variables used in estimating the cost functions; Table 2 reports some 
statistics for the whole banks sample and the bank groups. 
 
(insert Table 2 here)   17 
 
3.4 What causes cost inefficiency? 
We further investigate factors affecting bank efficiency in order to assess 
the importance of any (in)efficiency determinants. In particular, the main 
aim of the analysis is to examine whether bank organizational structure – 
proxied by functional distance, income diversification and size – differently 
affect bank groups efficiency. In the inefficiency model we also consider risk 
variables  and  macro  environmental  factors,  in  order  to  control  for  bank 
heterogeneity. 
Supposing  that  internal  and  environmental  economies  factors  impact  on 
bank efficiency, we propose a novel specification of the inefficiency model in 
which the means  it µ , associated with the cost inefficiency of bank i at time 
t,  are  assumed  to  be  specified  as  a  function  of  three  different  sets  of 
variables. The variables of interest are obviously related to business model 
strategy,  depending  on  the  bank  branching  diffusion  degree  (HQ-
DISTANCE),  its  income  diversification  policy  (DIVREV)  and  its  size  (SIZE). 
Furthermore,  to  account  for  asset  quality  and  the  bank  micro  credit  risk 
conditions, a second group of variables has been included: i) the loan-loss 
provisions over total net loans (LLP); ii) the traditional non-performing loans 
over  total  net  loans  ratio  (NPL).  Macro  environmental  effects  are  finally 
controlled  by:  i)  the  standard  provincial  GDP  annual  growth  rate;  ii)  the 
provincial firm default rate; and iii) a macro non-performing loans rate. 
Then the inefficiency model is specified as follows: 
 
(8)  
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The  income  diversification  index  (DIVREV)  measures  for  each  bank  the 
degree of diversification policy between traditional and non-interest income   18 
activities. Using the standard definition of NET (net interest income) and NII 
(net  non-interest  income)  and  according  to  Mercieca  et  al.  (2007),  we 






















and  then,  following  Stiroh  and  Rumble  (2006),  we  define  the  income 
diversification measure as: 
 
(9)   REV REV HHI DIV − =1 . 
 
As suggested by Chiorazzo et al. (2008), under the constraint that NET and 
NII have to assume positive values, this index varies from 0.0 to 0.5. It will 
be zero when the bank does not diversify its activity - because either it is 
strongly  concentrated  on  traditional  net  interest  income  or    highly  non-
interest income – and equals 0.5 when it is completely diversified. 
A novel measure of the functional distance (HQ-DISTANCE) between bank 
branches and its headquarter (HQ) is proposed. Our indicator is similar to 
the  F-DISTANCE  measure  suggested  by  Alessandrini  et  al.  (2009). 
Differently from the Authors, we construct the indicator for the i-bank at the 
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where  i B   ...,   1, = b z  are the municipalities where the i-bank has branches, 
with  i:1,..,I. 
2 2 ) ( )
i b i b b HQ z HQ z iz Y Y X (X D − + − =   is  the  Euclidean  distance 
between  the  municipality  zb  where  the  branch  is  located  and  the 
municipality where the HQ of the i-bank is located (HQi). The HQ-DISTANCE 
is  calculated  in  respect  to  municipalities  where  at  least  one  branch  is 
present, that is for almost 5,900 Italian municipalities
8,
9. 
Statistics reported in Table 3 show that the average functional distance of 
the  Italian  banking  system  is  40  kilometers,  being  strongly  different 
between  the  bank  groups.  Large  banks  and  joint  stock  banks  have  the 
highest value, respectively 166 and 116 kilometers; conversely, mutual and 
minor banks appear to be the most concentrated in the territory: the mean 
distance  between  the  HQ  and  branches  is  respectively  10  and  17.  The 
results suggest that the distance is correlated with the size of the bank. The 
scatter plots of the size and distance for the different bank groups (Fig. 1) 
confirm this relationship, being positive for large and joint stock banks and 
null for mutual and minor banks. 
 
(insert Fig. 1 here) 
 
In Figs. 2 the map of the HQ-DISTANCE over time are reported. The figures 
suggest that the operational units located in the South are the farthest from 
the  HQs,  mainly  located  in  the  Centre  and  in  the  North  of  Italy.  This  is 
coherent with the strong acquisition process of the south banking system 
carried out by the northern banks during the nineties (see among others 
Panetta, 2003). As expected mutual and minor banks are characterized by a 
                                                 
8 The total number of municipalities in Italy is 8,094, but in 2009 only 5,929 municipalities 
host at least one branch (5,926 in 2008, 5924 in 2007 and 5,926 in 2006). 
9 Another measure of distance has been recently proposed by Cotugno et al. 2011. They 
compute the distance as the difference between the kilometres between the zip code (ZIP) of 
the bank headquarters and the zip code (ZIP) of the municipalities in which the different 
branches are located (excluding the bank’s liaison offices) weighted by the branch’s months 
opening time.   20 
high proximity between the HQ and local branches, and this is particularly 
true for the regions where the mutual banking system is more developed 
(i.e.  Trentino-Alto  Adige,  Emilia-Romagna,  Marche,  Veneto  and  Toscana). 
The distance increases over the investigated period by 4%. 
 
(insert Fig. 2 here) 
 
The bank organizational structure is also controlled considered by using a 
measure of bank size (SIZE) - that is the natural logarithm of total asset. 
 
According to the literature a different bank organizational model implies a 
different credit risk policy. Because of the relationship lending, banks could 
be suffer of the so called soft-budget constraint for which when firms face 
an economic downturn the borrower is forced to renew the relative credit 
line. During a recession period, firm can be nearly certain that it will receive 
an  additional  loan  from  the  bank.  This  intertemporal  risk  smoothing 
provides a sort of liquidity insurance that is especially valuable for opaque 
firms (small, young and innovative firms), having difficulties to signal their 
own  creditworthiness  and  a  higher  probability  of  survive  to  an  economic 
crisis only if close ties with a bank is achieved (Boot and Thakor, 2000). 
The  above  considerations  and  the  evident  economic  distress  that  caused 
credit quality depreciation over the period suggest including asset risk and 
quality in the inefficiency models to control for the effect of risk on bank 
cost efficiency. The standard financial ratios used in the literature on bank 
efficiency to estimate credit risk are the loan loss provision over total net 
loans (LLP) and the non-performing loans over total net loans (NPL). 
The LLP index is computed for each bank as the ratio between the flow of 
loan-loss provisions over the stock of net loans. The loan loss provisions are 
determined  according  to  IAS  39  (pp.  17)  incurred  loss  approach.  When 
there is evidence of impairment “the amount of the loss measured as the   21 
difference  between  the  asset’s carrying  amount  and the  present  value  of 
estimated  future  cash  flows  (excluding  future  credit  losses  that  have  not 
been incurred) discounted at the financial asset’s original effective interest 
rate (i.e. the effective interest rate computed at initial recognition)” should 
be  charged  to  profit  or  loss  directly  or  through  the  use  of  an  allowance 
account. A bank has to assess whether impairment exists for loans that are 
individually significant. Loans that are not individually impaired have to be 
included  in  a  group  of  loans  with  similar  credit  risk  characteristics  and 
collectively assessed for impairment. Impairment of such groups of loans is 
estimated on the basis of historical loss experience, adjusted for changes in 
current conditions. However, it is forbidden to recognize expected losses as 
a result of future events. Recently many critics have been moved to this 
approach  arguing  that  it  does  not  reflect  the  true  credit  risk  in  loan 
portfolios  and  that  a  more  accurate  expected  loss  approach  is  advisable. 
Nevertheless some authors suggest that some degree of income smoothing 
persist even after IFRS adoption implying that LLP can be used as a proxy 
for  ex-ante  credit  risk
10.  Alternatively,  the  NPL  variable  measured  as  the 
ratio between the stock of the non-performing  loans over total net  loans 
ratio  is backward-looking and may be used as a proxy for ex-post credit 
risk
11 (cf. Fiordelisi et al., 2011). In the paper we use the last approach. 
 
In the previous literature on bank efficiency the credit risk has been studied 
by  simply  considering  its  effect  on  the  inefficiency  equation  (cf.  among 
others Akhigbe A., McNulty J.E., 2003 and 2005; Girardone et al., 2004). 
However  recent  studies  focusing  on  credit  risk  and  its  effects  over  the 
efficiency examine the causality of the relationship between efficiency and 
credit risk via capital, by using simultaneous equation models (Altunbas et 
                                                 
10 For an institutional comparison between the incurred and expected loss approach see IASB 
(2009a),  IASB  (2009b),  IASB  (2009c).  For  an  economic  perspective  see  among  others 
Burroni et al., 2009 and Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2010. 
11 According to the Bank of Italy (see Methodological Notes to the Provincial Credit Statistics) 
an alternative measure of credit risk could be defined as the ratio between the flow of new 
non-performing loans to the stock of performing loans at the end of the previous period. 
Such  a  ratio  has  been  used  as  a  control  variable  without  any  substantial  change  in  our 
results. Computation are available upon to request to the authors.   22 
al., 2007) and the Granger causality approach (Fiordelisi et al., 2010). In 
our study we deviate from these approaches because our aim is simply to 
evaluate  the  direct  effect  of  credit  risk  over  bank  inefficiency  without 
considering possible causality with capital. For this reason we omit from our 
models  the  capital  and  the  loan  growth  rate  being  highly  intercorrelated 
with the risk. 
 
Finally,  as  macro  indicators,  we  suggest  using  the annual  growth  rate  of 
GDP  (GDP_RT)  and  the  ratio  between  default  firms  and  registered  firms 
(DEF_RT).  The  two  macro  indicators  are  calculated  in  respect  to  i-bank, 
weighting the indicator at the province level with the ratio of branches in 
the province in respect to the total amount of branches of the i-bank. The 
procedure  allows  to  take  into  account  of  the  different  impact  that  each 
macro-indicator has on the bank, in respect to the presence of that bank in 
that province. 
Among  the  group  of  environmental  variable,  we  also  include  the  ratio 
between  non-performing  loans  and  total  net  loans  (NPL)  that,  using  a 
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12  We  use  a  threshold  value  of  6%,  following  the  definition  proposed  by  the  Interbank 
Deposit Protection Fund. The choice is also supported by some empirical evidences. Over the 
period  2006-2009,  the  median  value  of  NPL  over  total  net  loans  has  been  of  4.91%, 
evidencing a substantial stability over time.   23 
 
Data  for  the  macro  environmental  variables  are  mainly  based  on  ISTAT, 
Istituto  Tagliacarne  and  Bank  of  Italy  sources.  Table  A2  in  the  Appendix 
presents a detailed description of these variables; Table 3 reports the main 
statistics of the variables used in the inefficiency model. 
 






4.1 Dynamics and spatial distribution of cost efficiency scores 
Model  estimates  are  used  to  investigate:  i)  the  CE  level  of  the  Italian 
banking system and whether exists some degree of difference among bank 
groups; ii) cost efficiency dynamics ; iii) the geographical distribution of CE 
across  the  national  territory;  iv)  whether  the  HQ-branch  distance  and 
income  diversification  affect  cost  efficiency,  being  different  between  bank 
groups. 
To answer to the first three issues, we suggest using the CE values obtained 
by the model estimated on the full sample. To perform more straightforward 
comparisons, we compute the efficiency scores from a translog stochastic 
frontier model without the (in)efficiency model, enabling the comparison of 
cost efficiency over time, among groups and in the territory. Therefore, cost 
efficiency scores, representing the relative distance from the frontier cost 
realized by the best practice bank, are computed by equation (7). 
The average CE value over the sample period and across the bank sample is 
0.72, indicating that if banks are able to eliminate these inefficiencies, total   24 
costs could reduced by 28%. The most efficient banks all over the period 
appear  to  be  the  minor  and  the  mutual  ones.  Conversely,  large  and  the 
other  joint  stock  banks  show  the  lowest  CE  values.  Small  and  saving  & 
cooperative  banks  fall  within  the  range.  On  average  the  cost  efficiency 
differences between the most and the least efficient groups are 0.13 and 
0.16 for the size and type groups, respectively. 
The  average  efficiency  per  year,  calculated  for  the  full  sample  of  bank, 
increases until 2008, passing from 0.76 in 2006 to 0.80 in 2008, and then it 
decreases in 2009 to 0.79 (Fig. 3). As expected, the recent financial crisis 
determines a generalized cost efficiency reduction for all the Italian bank 
groups in 2008 and 2009. However some differences emerge in respect to 
the  different  groups  considered.  The  large  and  other  joint  stock  banks 
decrease their cost efficiency of 3.16% and 3.06%, respectively. The small 
and  saving  &  cooperative  groups  loss  on  average  3.11%  and  2.9% 
respectively. Finally minor and mutual banks loss only 1.20% and 0.83% 
respectively. 
 
(insert Figure 3 here) 
 
Cost  Efficiency  values  are  also  used  to  evaluate  the  geographical 
distribution of the banking system efficiency. In particular, cost efficiency at 
the  municipality  level  is  calculated  as  the  average  efficiency  of  banks 
located in the municipality, weighted by the number of their branches. The 
analysis  allows  to  investigate  the  geographical  concentration  of  bank 
efficiency across the Italian municipalities and the dynamics of the territorial 
efficiency distribution over the observed period of time. The maps, reported 
in  Figures  4,  suggest  at  least  three  interesting  considerations:  i)  as 
expected the most efficient municipalities are those located in the centre 
and in the north of the country; ii) a correspondence between distance and 
cost efficiency is observed: banks located in the south and farthest to the 
HQ appear to be less efficient than banks located to the north and close to 
the operational units. Among banks located in the North the most efficient   25 
are minor banks located in Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, 
Marche  and  Toscana;  iii)  the  efficiency  changes  over  time.  The  analysis 
shows some large banks located in the North – see for example the Milan 
neighbourhood  area  –  have  strongly  lost  efficiency  in  2008  and  2009 
compared  to  2006  and  2007.  This  is  not  the  case  for  banks  located  in 
peripheral regions, as for example Trentino Alto Adige, that – because of a 
different businessl model – maintain a quite stable value of efficiency over 
time. 
This  suggests  that,  besides  distance,  other  features  as  size  and  income 
diversification  strategies  could  have  paid  a  role  in  defining  a  different 
banking  structure  organization  and  thus  the  different  territorial  cost 
efficiency distribution. As we see before, these differences may vary with 
respect to the bank size and category, reflecting the strong  heterogeneity 
of the Italian banking system. 
 
(insert Figure 4 here) 
 
4.2 Inefficiency cost model estimates 
In  order  to  control  for  heterogeneity  of  the  banking  system,  stochastic 
frontier functions and inefficiency models are estimated for different groups 
of banks, allowing to verify the hypothesis of a single frontier for the Italian 
banking system. As main drivers of inefficiency, we consider the impact of 
business  structure  variables,  using  micro  financials  ratio  and  macro 
environmental factors as controlling variables in the inefficiency models. 
 
Model  estimates  confirm  a  relevant  heterogeneity  between  bank  groups 
with  respect  to  either  cost  frontier  or  inefficiency  determinants  (Tables  4 
and 5). The null hypothesis that the cost inefficiency effects are not present 
in  a  group,  given  the  specifications  of  the  stochastic  frontier  model,  is   26 
rejected for all groups. Then we examine if all the groups share the same 
technology.  A  likelihood-ratio  (LR)  test  of  the  null  hypothesis,  that  the 
group stochastic frontier models are the same for all banks, is calculated 
after estimating the stochastic frontier by pooling the data from all groups. 
The values of the LR statistic are 1,138 and 1,768, respectively for groups 
size or type, which are highly significant. This result strongly suggests that 
the groups’ stochastic frontiers for banks are not the same. 
 
(insert Tables 3&4 here) 
 
With respect to the banking business model, we first find a negative and 
significant  relationship  between  HQ-DISTANCE  and  efficiency.  Diverse 
results emerge in respect to the different groups. Distance appears to be an 
important  determinant  of  inefficiency,  in  particular  in  minor  and  mutual 
banks. Because of their organizational structure model minor  and mutual 
banks  would  be  characterized  by  strict  relationship  with  the  territorial 
operational units and with the customers. Given this characteristic as the 
distance  between  bank  branches  and  its  HQ  increases  the  cost  efficiency 
decreases more than in the case of larger banks; i.e. the effect of distance 
on efficiency is less important in the case of other banks being minimum for 
large banks. 
In literature the effect of financial diversification on bank performance has 
been largely investigated, without a general consensus. Our results appear 
partially  coherent  with  Chiorazzo  et  al.  (2008).  Authors  show  “limits  to 
diversification gains as banks get larger” while “small banks with very small 
non-interest  income  shares  experience  financial  performance  gains  from 
increasing non-interest income”. As DIVREV rises, the bank becomes more 
diversified and less concentrated. The benefit of diversification outweigh the 
cost  of  NII  volatility  increasing  efficiency,  only  in  the  case  of  small  and 
minor banks. In all other cases the opposite results – even if with different   27 
nuances in the bank groups – hold, coherently with Mercieca et al. (2007) 
and Lozano-Vivas and Paiouras (2010). The effect of income diversification 
is in fact strongly negative increasing inefficiency only for large and other 
joint stock banks. For mutual banks even if an increase in the diversification 
implies more inefficiency, the effect is quite marginal. 
Finally  to  better  investigate  the  effects  of  banking  business  organization 
structure on the inefficiency we control for the SIZE effect. Our results are 
coherent  with  some  previous  studies  (see  among  others  Akhigbe  and 
McNulty,  2003  and  Girardone  et  al.,  2004)  suggesting  that  economies  of 
scale  and  efficiency  gains  hold  only  for  small  banks.  Our  results  suggest 
that increasing bank size may improve efficiency only in the case of minor 
and mutual banks. Otherwise, size does not play any role in small and large 
banks (having already reached their best economies of scale) and decrease 
efficiency in the case of saving & cooperative and other joint stock banks. 
As  regards  to  micro  risk  conditions,  model  estimates  reveal  that,  as 
expected,  as  LLP  increases,  bank  inefficiency  increases.  Some  exceptions 
emerge in the case of small and other joint stock bank, being the estimates 
statistically insignificant and in the case of large banks with a negative sign. 
As  regards  the  NPL  variable,  a  negative  relationship  with  efficiency  is 
detected, but the effect does not appear statistical significant in the case of 
large and other joint stock banks. A short term view could incentive a moral 
hazard  behaviour  implying  less  credit  screening  and  monitoring  with 
increasing cost efficiency. As a result, in the short run an increase of LLP 
may even increase efficiency while an increase in the NPL produce a null 
effect.  As  suggested  by  Berger  and  DeYoung  (1997)  a  “cost  skimping” 
hypothesis implies that the quality of banks loan portfolio is a consequence 
of  the  costs  related  to  the  monitoring  of  lending  activities,  generating  a 
positive  correlation  between  cost  efficiency  and  bad  loans.  Similarly 
Fiordelisi et al., 2011, p. 1317 underline that a “cost skimping” hypothesis 
implies  “a  trade-off  between  short-term  cost  efficiency  and  future  risk-
taking due to moral hazard considerations. In such cases, banks appear to   28 
be more cost efficient as they devote fewer resources to credit screening 
and monitoring”. 
Finally, the main effects of environmental macro conditions on efficiency are 
controlled for. The per-capita value added growth rate (GDP) produces, as 
expected, a positive effect on banking efficiency even if its intensity is not 
homogenous  among  the  different  bank  groups.  The  macro  risk  variables 
produce a negative effect on bank efficiency. Firm default rate (DEF_RT) is 
the most important determinant of efficiency in the minor and mutual banks 
groups;  conversely,  the  macro  credit  risk  (NPL_INDEX)  negatively  affects 
cost  efficiency  with  minor  intensity.  The  NPL_INDEX  shows  a  stronger 
impact  on  large  and  joint  stock  banks,  being  characterized  by  a  more 
distant branching structure distribution over the territory that may penalize 
the correct perception of the local macro credit risk
13. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the cost efficiency of the Italian banking system 
with  the  aim  to    analyze  the  extent  to  which  income  diversification  and 
relationship lending affect bank efficiency and whether the effect changes 
among different groups of banks, classified by size and institutional type. 
Using  a  stochastic  frontier  approach  a  strong  heterogeneity  within  the 
Italian  banking  system  is  detected  with  respect  to  either  the  level  of 
efficiency  reached  by  the  different  groups  or  the  determinants  of  cost 
efficiency. 
The analysis of the cost efficiency for the full sample evidences that bank 
groups  characterized  by  an  organizational  local  structure  (minor,  mutual, 
small and cooperative & saving banks) are more efficient than largest and 
farthest  banks.  The  average  efficiency  per  year,  calculated  for  the  full 
sample of bank, increases until 2008, passing from 0.76 in 2006 to 0.80 in 
2008,  and  then  it  decreases  in  2009  to  0.79.  As  expected,  the  recent 
                                                 
13 The information advantage hypothesis (see among others Mester et al., 1998) suggests 
that small banks have access to better credit information than large banks. Moreover the 
closeness of the branch to the HQ implies less agency problems between the bank and the 
loan officer implying a better screening policy.   29 
financial crisis determines a generalized cost efficiency reduction for all the 
Italian  bank  groups.  However  some  differences  emerge  in  respect  to  the 
different groups considered. The large and other joint stock banks decrease 
their  cost  efficiency  of  3.16%  and  3.06%,  respectively.  The  small  and 
saving  and  cooperatives  groups  loss  on  average  3.11%  and  2.9% 
respectively. Finally minor and mutual banks loss only 1.20% and 0.83% 
respectively. 
The  geographical  distribution  of  the  efficiency  scores  reveals  other 
interesting features of the banking system. In particular, the analysis allows 
to investigate the geographical concentration of bank efficiency across the 
Italian  municipalities  and  the  dynamics  of  the  territorial  efficiency 
distribution  over  the  observed  period  of  time.  As  expected,  the  most 
efficient municipalities are those located in the centre and in the north of 
the country and the existence of a correspondence between distance and 
cost efficiency: banks located in the south and farthest to the HQ appear to 
be less efficient than banks located to the north and close to the operational 
units. 
Another interesting result comes from the comparison of efficiency loss in 
2008 and 2009. Regions characterized by the presence of large banks even 
close to their branch network suffer more than areas where a local bank 
model prevails. This suggests that, besides distance, other features as size 
and  income  diversification  strategies  could  have  had  a  role  in  defining  a 
different  banking  structure  organization,  affecting  the  different  territorial 
cost efficiency distribution.  
To better investigate these aspects we consider as inefficiency determinants 
both  bank  branch  distance  distribution  and  income  diversification  The 
results  confirm  the  importance  of  the  distance  in  determining  bank 
efficiency. As the distance increases the efficiency decreases. According to 
the  information  asymmetry  theory,  an  organizational  structure  with  close 
interaction between the HQ unit and the peripheral operational units better 
disentangle asymmetric information problems between lender and borrower   30 
increasing bank efficiency. Coherently with previous evidence an increase in 
bank size implies a positive effect on cost efficiency only in the case of very 
small banks. Finally the income diversification positively affects efficiency. 
The  credit  risk  factors  are  also  investigated.  We  distinguished  between 
micro and macro risk conditions with different results. An increased credit 
risk implies a generalized decrease in efficiency for all the groups examined 
even if some exceptions emerge with reference the large group where an 
increase  in  LLP  and  in  NPL  imply  according  to  the  “cost  skimping” 
hypothesis  respectively  an  increase  in  the  efficiency  and  any  statistical 
significant effect. The micro risk effects on efficiency appear coherent with 
the results produced in the case of the macro risk consideration. Even if the 
macro-risk implies a definitive negative effect on the efficiency its intensity 
is more important in the case of large banks than in the case of minor and 
mutual banks. One again an asymmetric information hypothesis holds. Local 
banks benefit from a close approach between the HQ and the operational 
unit or the customer helping to better disentangle local credit risk. 
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Fig. 2. Functional distance over 2006-2009 period 
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Fig. 2. (continued) 
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Note: Kruskal-Wallis tests reject the null hypothesis of equality of the median efficiencies 
either between groups or over time for each group.     40 
Figure 4. Cost efficiency over 2006-2009 period 
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Figure 3. (continued) 
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Table 1. Sample size and population coverage 
Size groups 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Large 45 46 46 46 183
7.04% 7.07% 7.06% 7.20% 7.09%
Small  110 110 110 110 440
17.76% 17.44% 17.27% 17.76% 17.56%
Minor 487 499 501 487 1974
75.19% 75.49% 75.68% 75.04% 75.35%
Juridical groups 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Cooperative & saving  85 86 88 86 345
13.24% 13.13% 13.39% 13.37% 13.28%
Other listed banks 140 145 146 147 578
21.81% 22.14% 22.22% 22.86% 22.26%
Mutual banks 417 424 423 410 1674
64.95% 64.73% 64.38% 63.76% 64.46%
Total unbalanced sample
642 655 657 643 2597
Total sample over total national system 89.29% 90.10% 91.50% 90.95% 90.46%  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of input and output variables 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Cost (Profit) (in thousand €)
Total cost (TC) 5,934 4,213 125 50,790 39,494 1,721 440,291 229,486 49,314 46,659 6,389 4,390
Total profit (TP) 2,400 1,491 96 19,274 16,625 1,339 194,436 123,484 22,505 19,908 2,311 1,996
Output Quantities (in thousand €)
Loans (L) 173,788 114,216 3,807 1,668,936 1,312,245 54,930 15,700,000 9,663,200 1,563,880 1,621,594 186,638 145,055
Demand deposits (DD) 120,553 84,037 2,478 1,075,175 848,196 41,259 9,933,550 6,125,053 1,020,307 1,009,855 122,762 90,978
Other earning assets (OEA) 66,734 45,833 1,624 640,517 364,463 36,213 13,900,000 4,279,767 2,315,034 1,217,314 65,979 190,432
Equity (E) 29,204 20,875 691 211,018 156,099 7,400 2,849,192 994,738 460,980 275,178 31,484 38,055
Input prices
Price of labor (p1) 51.855 49.707 0.406 54.310 49.756 0.888 65.542 54.520 3.915 53.316 49.920 0.459
Price of funds (p2) 0.012 0.011 0.000 0.015 0.013 0.001 0.019 0.014 0.002 0.013 0.011 0.000
Price of fixed capital (p3) 2.480 0.742 0.331 3.828 0.729 0.658 11.210 1.192 2.332 3.349 0.760 0.327
Large  Small Minor Total
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Cost (Profit) (in thousand €)
Total cost (TC) 5,763 4,043 164 79,517 41,137 6,213 141,974 30,247 17,690 46,659 6,389 4,390
Total profit (TP) 2,562 1,502 91 35,120 14,939 3,990 59,628 11,461 7,949 19,908 2,311 1,996
Output Quantities (in thousand €)
Loans (L) 196,194 114,454 6,094 2,891,087 1,254,740 238,003 4,956,075 921,942 588,912 1,621,594 186,638 145,055
Demand deposits (DD) 132,434 85,739 4,625 1,799,412 864,407 148,637 2,949,291 443,790 357,097 1,009,855 122,762 90,978
Other earning assets (OEA) 66,641 44,221 2,308 1,205,709 287,398 208,399 4,363,544 307,187 785,300 1,217,314 65,979 190,432
Equity (E) 30,696 19,643 866 439,517 145,465 50,553 860,114 129,041 156,369 275,178 31,484 38,055
Input prices
Price of labor (p1) 50.348 49.323 0.403 50.039 49.391 0.367 63.133 54.336 1.534 53.316 49.920 0.459
Price of funds (p2) 0.011 0.011 0.000 0.013 0.012 0.001 0.018 0.014 0.001 0.013 0.011 0.000
Price of fixed capital (p3) 1.105 0.692 0.053 1.409 0.706 0.140 10.623 1.889 1.357 3.349 0.760 0.327
Mutual Saving & Cooperative Other listed Total
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the inefficiency variables 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Banking business model
Functional distance (F-DISTANCE) 1.675 1.753 0.022 3.091 2.969 0.056 4.003 4.097 0.091 2.083 2.009 0.025
Income diversification (INDIV) 0.294 0.298 0.002 0.362 0.396 0.006 0.392 0.441 0.010 0.313 0.317 0.002
Total assets (in thousand €) (SIZE) 249,763 177,321 4,912 2,432,433 2,007,386 66,850 31,200,000 15,100,000 3,602,197 2,977,222 280,074 317,832
Micro risk conditions
Loan loss provisions/Total net loans (LLP) 0.005 0.004 0.017 0.006 0.005 0.043 0.006 0.005 0.044 0.005 0.004 0.015
Non performing loans/Total net loans (NPL)  0.019 0.012 0.001 0.014 0.011 0.001 0.014 0.011 0.001 0.018 0.012 0.001
Macro environmental conditions
GDP growth rate (GDP) 99.335 99.179 0.064 98.784 98.654 0.137 98.632 98.117 0.169 99.191 99.092 0.055
Firm default rate (DEFAULT_RT) 2.536 2.160 0.040 2.673 2.335 0.065 3.107 2.605 0.106 2.602 2.190 0.033
Macro NPL (NPL_INDEX) 25.488 1.000 0.925 18.239 1.000 1.413 15.347 8.030 1.546 23.530 1.000 0.753
Large  Small Minor Total
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Banking business model
Functional distance (F-DISTANCE) 1.625 1.742 0.019 2.793 2.769 0.053 2.950 3.187 0.071 2.083 2.009 0.025
Income diversification (INDIV) 0.292 0.294 0.002 0.376 0.390 0.005 0.338 0.386 0.006 0.313 0.317 0.002
Total assets (in thousand €) (SIZE) 272,993 171,964 8,426 4,343,028 1,714,980 402,883 9,673,590 1,466,576 1,288,865 2,977,222 280,074 317,832
Micro risk conditions
Loan loss provisions/Total net loans (LLP) 0.005 0.003 0.016 0.006 0.005 0.035 0.007 0.005 0.041 0.005 0.004 0.015
Non performing loans/Total net loans (NPL)  0.018 0.013 0.001 0.015 0.012 0.001 0.019 0.009 0.003 0.018 0.012 0.001
Macro environmental conditions
GDP growth rate (GDP) 99.355 99.179 0.071 99.182 98.913 0.166 98.762 98.575 0.102 99.191 99.092 0.055
Firm default rate (DEFAULT_RT) 2.370 2.110 0.042 2.680 2.465 0.075 3.176 2.600 0.066 2.602 2.190 0.033
Macro NPL (NPL_ INDEX) 26.481 1.000 1.030 20.609 1.000 1.881 17.144 1.000 1.149 23.530 1.000 0.753
Mutual Saving & Cooperative Other listed Total
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HQ-DISTANCE 0.223 * 0.042 ** 0.023 * 0.088 *
DIVREV -1.402 * -0.090 * 0.455 * 0.168 **
SIZE -0.423 * -0.089 0.175 0.051 *
Micro risk conditions
LLP 0.205 * -0.044 -0.131 ** 0.078 *
NPL 0.375 * 0.125 * -0.054 0.078 *
Environmental macro conditions
GDP -5.025 * 0.315 -1.367 ** -0.239
DEF_RT 1.419 * -0.013 -0.118 0.319 *
NPL_INDEX 0.042 * 0.084 * 0.157 * 0.024 *
CE_group 0.78 0.88 0.66 0.76
CE_pool 0.81 0.71 0.64 0.72
LL -177.91 -24.66 -71.20 -904.70
p-value: * 0.05; ** 0.10.
Minor Small Large Full
 
Note: LR tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of a single frontier for the Italian banking 
system either for the size groups. The LR test of the one sided error for the null hypothesis of 








HQ-DISTANCE 0.137 * 0.105 * 0.058 * 0.088 *
DIVREV 0.098 * -0.180 0.602 * 0.168 **
SIZE -0.239 * 0.093 * 0.136 * 0.051 *
Micro risk conditions
LLP 0.028 * 0.420 * -0.028 0.078 *
NPL 0.037 * 0.285 * -0.005 0.078 *
Environmental macro conditions
GDP -0.410 -0.431 -0.550 * -0.239
DEF_RT 0.157 * 0.124 -0.206 0.319 *
NPL_INDEX 0.017 * 0.042 * 0.136 * 0.024 *
CE_group 0.82 0.85 0.74 0.76
CE_pool 0.82 0.72 0.69 0.72
LL 322.50 91.51 -434.35 -904.70
p-value: * 0.05; ** 0.10.
Mutual Sav&Coop Other listed Full
 
Note: LR tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of a single frontier for the Italian banking 
system either for the categorical typologies. The LR test of the one sided error for the null 
hypothesis of no technical efficiency is also strongly rejected for all the models. 
 
 